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After a long history of neglecting children with special 
needs, Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) to grant every child with a qualifying 
disability the right to a free and appropriate public 
education.  To ensure local compliance, the IDEA created a 
private right of action through which parents may sue their 
school district for failing to offer an adequate education for 
their child.  If successful, these parents, may then send their 
child to a private school at the expense of their local 
government.  Private enforcement of the IDEA has helped 
equalize educational opportunities for wealthy children whose 
parents can afford to commit to the financial, emotional, and 
physical costs of suing the government, but children of less 
affluent families who cannot afford to make similar 
commitments are often left behind when a school district fails 
to adhere to the IDEA’s mandate.  As a result, large special 
educational disparities exist in segregated school districts 
between wealthy, predominantly white families and less 
affluent, predominantly non-white families.   
State and local governments have mostly limited their 
efforts to fully achieve the IDEA’s goal by implementing 
voucher programs, which allow only a handful of low-income 
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children to enjoy the educational opportunities afforded to 
their wealthier peers.  Under Mayor Bill De Blasio, New York 
City took a different approach and began settling most IDEA 
claims to effectively lower the procedural barrier for parents.  
Much like vouchers, however, De Blasio’s policy fails to 
address the underlying issue: The IDEA’s reliance on private 
enforcement will continue to fail those who historically have 
been deliberately excluded from the full social and economic 
benefits of white citizenship.  State and local governments 
must go beyond tinkering with the accessibility of the private 
enforcement mechanism and instead invest financial 
resources to equalize educational opportunity through public 
enforcement of the IDEA.  This Note assesses potential state 
and local policy reforms to secure expanded special education 
opportunity and discusses how New York City can begin to 
effectively lead in IDEA public enforcement.  
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 The controversies and ultimate outcome of the 2016 
presidential election will provide more than enough material 
for historians to document what our country endured over 
the last two years.  What will probably not make the 
historical accounts of the presidential campaign, however, is 
how candidate Hillary Clinton elevated disability rights to a 
position of visibility the issue has not enjoyed in decades.  
During her speech accepting the Democratic Party’s 
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nomination for president, Secretary Clinton outlined her 
early career, during which she first became involved in 
disability activism:  
I went to work for the Children’s Defense 
Fund, going door to door in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts on behalf of children with 
disabilities who were denied the chance to go 
to school.  I remember meeting a young girl in 
a wheelchair on the small back porch of her 
house.  She told me how badly she wanted to 
go to school.  It just didn’t seem possible in 
those days … our work helped convince 
Congress to ensure access to education for all 
students with disabilities.  It’s a big idea, isn’t 
it?  Every kid with a disability has the right to 
go to school.1 
Secretary Clinton was referring to the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which grants every child 
with a qualifying disability the right to a free and 
appropriate public education.  The anecdote that Clinton 
shared was not an uncommon occurrence in the United 
States prior to the Act’s implementation.  To tackle the 
historic exclusion of children with disabilities from public 
schools, the IDEA established a collaborative framework for 
school districts and parents to work together to craft 
individualized education plans outlining the particular needs 
of a given child with a qualifying disability.  That plan 
determines which public school within the district can 
accommodate the child’s specific needs. 
If the right to a free and appropriate public education 
granted by the IDEA is not adequately provided to a child 
with a qualifying disability, parents may file a due process 
complaint and, after exhausting available state 
                                                 
1Damon Winter, Transcript: Hillary Clinton’s Speech at the Democratic 
Convention, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/us/politics/hillary-clinton-dnc-
transcript.html? [https://perma.cc/8JVY-MWV3]. 
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administrative remedies, they may choose to sue their local 
school district for the cost to place their child in an 
appropriate private school instead of the public school 
system.  This mechanism for parental enforcement of the 
IDEA, while well intentioned, has resulted in socioeconomic 
and racial disparities in the access to quality special 
education.  Wealthy white families initiate such complaints, 
and in turn ensure better educational opportunities for their 
children, more frequently than non-white or non-wealthy 
parents.  As a result, school districts are more responsive to 
the families that can afford the risk of pursuing such legal 
action, creating a socioeconomic and racial disparity in 
special education services.  This problem is particularly 
pronounced in New York City. 
With roughly one million students, New York City 
runs the largest school system in the United States.  
Unfortunately, it is also one of the most racially segregated.2  
New York’s response to tuition reimbursement claims under 
the IDEA has changed drastically between the 
administrations of former Mayor Michael Bloomberg and 
current Mayor Bill De Blasio, with—as a general rule—the 
former in favor of litigating such claims against the City and 
the later in favor of settling them.  This Note will examine 
whether the new policy helps further the overall mission of 
the IDEA to provide quality public special education to 
children with a qualifying disability, and consider 
alternative local policy reforms that may better achieve the 
Act’s goal.   
Part I summarizes Congressional action to provide 
students with disabilities access to public special education, 
discusses how federal law has evolved and how the Courts 
have clarified (and sometimes complicated) the scope of the 
law, and outlines how parents can secure and challenge 
special education placement through the IDEA’s procedural 
safeguards.  Part II discusses how IDEA safeguards are 
                                                 
2 See THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, Executive Summary - New York State’s 
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disproportionately burdensome for low-income families, 
summarizes racial segregation in the American public 
special education system, and explains mayoral policy 
changes related to procedural safeguards in the City.  Part 
III assesses various policy reforms for strengthening the 
IDEA and highlights reforms that can be achieved within 
local government, as opposed to reforms that would require 
Congressional or federal agency action.  Part III also 
discusses the merits and drawbacks of three popular reform 
suggestions: Voucher programs, state-funded legal 
assistance, and public enforcement of the IDEA. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT 
This part summarizes Congressional action to provide 
students with disabilities access to public special education 
and will include a discussion on how federal law has evolved 
and how the Courts have clarified (and sometimes 
complicated) the scope of the law.  An outline of how parents 
can go about securing and challenging special education 
placement through the IDEA’s procedural safeguards will 
follow that overview. 
A. Legislative History and Judicial Scrutiny of 
the IDEA  
Prior to Congressional action addressing educational 
access for children with disabilities, most disabled children 
“were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in 
regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old 
enough to drop out.”3  Middle-class white parents organized 
in opposition to this exclusion, demanding that their disabled 
children have the same educational access as their non-
disabled peers.4  Non-white families joined the movement, 
                                                 
3 H. R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975). 
4 Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A 
Parent's Perspective and Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
331, 362 (1994).  
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although many of their concerns focused on the use of special 
education as a means of segregating non-white students from 
regular public education classrooms.5  By the early 1970s, 
special education advocates won important legal battles in 
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. that helped legitimize 
their demands.6    
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act in 1975, later renamed in 1990 as the IDEA, to 
“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to 
them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes 
special education and related services designed to meet their 
unique needs and prepare them for further education, 
employment, and independent living.”7  States are primarily 
responsible for carrying out this mandate; as a condition of 
receiving federal education funding, states must devise and 
implement a plan to achieve free access for all students with 
disabilities as defined by the statute to a free and 
appropriate public special education.8   
To qualify for the IDEA, a child must have a 
statutorily recognized disability that requires special 
educational and related services. 9   Disability is broadly 
defined to include a range of physical and mental disabilities, 
such as learning disabilities, hearing impairments, 
emotional disabilities, or autism.10  The contours of a free 
and appropriate public education (FAPE) that a qualifying 
child has a statutory right to receive is determined by that 
child’s individualized education program (IEP), a written 
statement outlining the services that the child requires and 
                                                 
5 Id.  
6 See generally Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (In the 
same year, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
denying children with disabilities public education violates the Due 
Process Clause) and Pennsylvania Ass’n, Ret’d Child. v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (In 1972, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approved a settlement 
agreement that barred public schools from excluding children with mental 
disabilities). 
7 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012).  
8 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); § 1413 (2012).  
9 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2012).  
10 Id.  
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specifying a local public school that will be tasked with 
providing those services to the child over the following 
academic year.11  Every child’s IEP is unique to that child’s 
specific needs.  The IDEA’s ambiguous definition of what 
constitutes a FAPE, and the dispute whether a specific IEP 
has satisfied that standard, is responsible for much of the 
litigation surrounding the statute.  
The Supreme Court first attempted to clarify this 
ambiguity in the 1982 Rowley decision, in which the Court 
held that the right to a FAPE is satisfied when certain 
procedural and substantive requirements are met. 12  
Procedural requirements consist of the step-by-step process 
for developing an IEP that the statute outlines, such as who 
must be present at the meeting to draft the IEP and the 
timeline for finalizing the document.13  Unlike the procedural 
requirements, which are explicitly rooted in the statutory 
text, substantive requirements are created by judicial 
interpretation of Congress’ intent when passing the IDEA.  
To meet such requirements, an IEP must simply “confer 
some educational benefit” to the child in the least restrictive 
environment. 14   Put another way, the IEP must be 
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing 
marks and advance from grade to grade.”15   
While the Supreme Court has “specifically rejected 
the contention that the ‘appropriate education’ mandated by 
[the] IDEA requires states to ‘maximize the potential of 
handicapped children,’” much ambiguity remains about how 
to determine what satisfies the “some educational benefit” 
standard.16  Some circuits interpret the standard to mean 
that the school must provide a benefit that “merely [be] ‘more 
than de minimis.’”17  Other circuits apply a higher standard, 
                                                 
11 § 1401(9)(D).  
12 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982). 
13 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012).  
14 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 102.  
15 Id.  
16 Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998).  
17 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338-39 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 
1149 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
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requiring that the school district show that the placement 
will result in a “meaningful educational benefit.” 18   The 
Supreme Court resolved this split recently by rejecting the 
Tenth Circuit’s standard as inadequate.19  It appears that 
students in New York City are still subject to the 
“meaningful educational [benefit]” standard, which the 
Second Circuit adopted in 1998.20 
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to 
understand that “no public actor is tasked with reviewing on 
its own initiative the substance of individual children's 
IEPs.” 21   The responsibility instead falls squarely on the 
parent, who can ensure compliance only through the private 
enforcement mechanism outlined in the Section B of this 
Part. 22   The statute provides that parents who are 
unsatisfied with a local school district’s compliance with 
their child’s IEP may, among other options like requesting a 
new IEP or public school placement, take their child out of 
the assigned public school and enroll the child in a private 
institution.  The parent may then seek tuition 
reimbursement from the school district. 
As parents began to take advantage of their IDEA due 
process rights, the Supreme Court issued a few decisions 
clarifying the parameters of private enforcement.  In the 
1985 Burlington decision, the Court held that if a parent can 
demonstrate that a school district’s placement is 
inappropriate (that is, the school did not satisfy the 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 862 (6th Cir. 
2004); Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 
808-09 (5th Cir. 2003); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 
853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988).  
19 See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) 
(holding that the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis standard produces a result 
“tantamount to sitting idly . . . awaiting the time when they were old 
enough to drop out.”) (internal citations omitted).  
20 Walczak, 142 F.3d at 133. 
21 Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private 
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2011).   
22 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012); see also Joseph Tulman, Are There Too Many 
Due Process Cases? An Examination Of Jurisdictions With Relatively High 
Rates of Special Education Hearings, 18 UDC-DCSL L. REV. 249, 250 
(2015).  
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appropriate education standard), and show that their 
alternative private school placement is appropriate, that 
parent may recover the costs of the private school tuition 
from the government.23  The rationale is that a child has a 
statutory right to a FAPE, so if the school district fails to 
provide such a right, it must at least help parents finance the 
means to secure that right through a private school.  A few 
years later, the Court clarified in the Carter decision that a 
parent may seek tuition reimbursement for private school 
even if the private school is not on a state-approved list of 
institutions to provide special education services. 24   This 
decision has allowed parents more discretion in finding an 
alternative placement to an inadequate public school.  After 
the Court held in Smith that the IDEA did not allow parents 
who were successful in their tuition reimbursement claims to 
collect attorneys’ fees, Congress amended the Act in 1986 to 
reverse the Court’s decision and explicitly permit the 
recovery of attorneys’ fees for parents who are successful in 
enforcing their child’s IDEA rights.25 
While members of Congress found that “substantial 
gains had been made in the area of special education” by the 
late 1990s, they determined that further action was 
necessary “to guarantee children with disabilities adequate 
access to appropriate services.” 26   Congress amended the 
IDEA in 1997 “to place greater emphasis on improving 
student performance and [ensure] that children with 
disabilities receive a quality public education.” 27   These 
amendments required states to offer a voluntary mediation 
session for parents who seek an administrative hearing to 
enforce their due process rights. 28   By placing a “new 
emphasis on the importance of mediation as an alternative 
method of resolving special education conflicts,” Congress 
hoped to slow the growth of IDEA litigation and foster 
                                                 
23 Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). 
24 Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993). 
25  Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, PUB. L. NO. 99-372; 
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984). 
26 See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009).  
27 S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 3 (1997) 
28 § 1415(e). 
408 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
 
greater collaboration between parents and school districts.29  
In 2004, Congress again amended the IDEA to explicitly 
codify the right to tuition reimbursement and, absent a 
waiver, mandate the participation in a resolution session 
after a parent files a due process complaint.30 
The Court has issued three decisions related to 
private enforcement since the 2004 IDEA amendments.  In 
Arlington Central School District, the Court held that while 
the IDEA allows parents who are successful in their claims 
to collect attorney fees, the Act does not allow parents to 
collect the costs of experts they may decide to use in the 
litigation to illustrate the adequacy of a school placement.31  
Then in Winkelman, the Court clarified that a parent may 
bring a tuition reimbursement claim pro se.32  And in Forest 
Grove, clarifying ambiguity from the 1997 amendments, the 
Court held that a parent is entitled to reimbursement for a 
non-public placement even if their child did not previously 
receive special education services in a public school.33  
B. IDEA Procedural Requirements: Private 
Enforcement  
Parental consent and involvement is at the heart of 
the IDEA, which outlines a rigid procedural framework to 
govern a child’s access to special education.  These 
safeguards exist “to insure the full participation of the 
parents and proper resolution of substantive 
disagreements.” 34   States have the discretion to establish 
additional procedures so long as they do not conflict with the 
IDEA. 35   Given that the focus of this Note is special 
                                                 
29 See Steve Baldridge & David Doty, MEDIATION UNDER THE NEW IDEA: 
ROOM TO BE REASONABLE, at 1 (1998). 
3020 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); § 1415(f)(1)(b) (2012). 
31 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 
(2006). 
32 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007). 
33 Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A., 557 U.S. 230, 246-47 (2009). 
34 Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368. 
35 See § 1415(a). 
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education access in New York City, this Section will outline 
the due process requirements in New York state. 
1. Identifying Disability 
If a school district suspects that a child may have a 
qualifying IDEA disability, it must first obtain the consent of 
the parent before evaluating the child.36  Once the parent 
provides their consent, or requests an evaluation of their 
child through their own initiative, the child is evaluated 
(without financial cost to the parent) in a manner that 
includes a physical exam, psychological exam, and 
observations of the student’s current academic performance 
and social behavior.37  If the evaluation determines that the 
child has any of the qualifying disabilities outlined by the 
statute, and thus has a right to special education under the 
IDEA, the child is entitled to an IEP. 38  A committee on 
special education (CSE) develops a child’s IEP.39  The CSE 
consists of, at minimum, the child’s parent, regular education 
teacher, a special education teacher, and a school 
psychologist. 40   A representative from the school district 
“who is qualified to provide or supervise special education 
and who is knowledgeable about the general education 
curriculum and the availability of resources of the school 
district” must also be present and serves as chairperson for 
the CSE.41  When scheduling CSE meetings, the chairperson 
must take great care to ensure that the parent is able to 
attend and participate.42  The CSE must produce an IEP that 
includes an assessment of the child’s current level of 
performance, specific disability classification, measurable 
academic and functional goals, instructional benchmarks for 
evaluating such goals, and required educational and related 
                                                 
36 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.4(a) (2017). 
37 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.4(b) (2017). 
38 § 200.4(d)(2). 
39 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.3. 
40 § 200.3(a)(1). 
41 § 200.3(a)(1)(v). 
42 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(d). 
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services.43  This process is repeated each academic year as a 
child’s IEP serves as a governing document for that child’s 
educational needs, and the IEP may change as the child 
makes progress from year to year.44  
In order to comply with the substantive requirements 
of a FAPE, a child’s educational placement must also be in 
the “least restrictive environment” (LRE). 45   The LRE 
requirement indicates a strong preference for educating a 
child in a mixed public school classroom instead of 
segregating that student into a special education-only 
classroom. 46   States that do not comply with the LRE 
provision are in danger of losing federal funding.47 
2. Enforcing IDEA Rights 
Parents unsatisfied with the educational services 
provided to their child have available to them procedural 
safeguards to address such concerns and ensure IDEA 
compliance. 48  A parent has two years from the date the 
parent knew, or should have known, about the basis of their 
concern to file a due process complaint with the state or local 
educational agency. 49   This complaint must include a 
description of the problem the child is facing in the assigned 
public school and a proposed solution, which in New York 
state, is usually a reimbursement request for the tuition at a 
private school that the parent believes will more adequately 
serve their child’s educational needs. 50   Within the same 
                                                 
43 § 200.4(d)(2). 
44 § 200.4(f). 
45 § 200.4(d)(4)(ii). 
46 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012); see also T.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 161 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122) 
(noting LRE “requirement ‘expresses a strong preference for children with 
disabilities to be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, together 
with their non-disabled peers.’”) 
47 § 1412(a)(5)(B) (2012). 
48 See § 1415 (2012). 
49 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404 (1) (Consol. 2017); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2).  
50  § 1415(a)(7); see also Gilbert McMahon, NYS Special Education 
Impartial Hearing Outcomes, 
http://www.specialedlawadvocacy.com/NYS%20Special%20Education%20I
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timeframe, the parent must also request an impartial 
hearing, in which an impartial hearing officer (IHO) will 
review the parents’ complaint, and the state’s response to the 
complaint, in order to render a decision.51  The IHO cannot 
be an employee of the state or local educational agency and is 
limited in their decision-making capacity to address only the 
issues raised in the initial complaint, unless the parties 
otherwise agree.52 
The IHO’s determination of whether a child received a 
FAPE is usually made on substantive grounds, including 
whether a child’s placement is in the least restrictive 
environment or satisfies the “meaningful education benefit” 
standard.53  An IHO can only find that a child did not receive 
a FAPE on procedural grounds if such “inadequacies (i) 
Impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; (ii) Significantly 
impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE 
to the parent’s child; or (iii) Caused a deprivation of 
educational benefit.”54  These issues arise in the formulation 
of the child’s IEP. 
The agency or parent may appeal the IHO’s decision 
to a state review officer (SRO). 55 , New York’s two-tiered 
system is a rarity that adds an extra procedural step for the 
parent; as of 2010, forty states and Washington, D.C have 
only one-tiered systems for IDEA due process hearings. 56  If 
either party is dissatisfied with the SRO decision, the party 
may appeal to the New York Supreme Court or the relevant 
United States federal district court. 57   These procedural 
safeguards are included in an annual notice sent to parents 
                                                                                                         
mpartial%20Hearing%20Outcomes.pdf (indicating that over half of IDEA 
complaints in New York state relate to tuition reimbursement claims).  
51 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2002).  
52 Id.; § 200.5(j)(4). 
53 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a) (2002); see also Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130. 
54 § 300.513(a)(2). 
55 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(2) (Consol. 2017). 
56 Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under the 
IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 5 (2010). 
57 EDUC. § 4404(3). 
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in their native language in an attempt to inform parents of 
the rights the IDEA affords them and their children.58 
  Congress provided additional means of redress for 
parents outside of the otherwise linear due process system.  
Parents may decide to pursue mediation instead of an 
impartial hearing. 59   Mediation is voluntary and if an 
agreement is reached, it is legally binding in state and 
federal district courts. 60   Congress created the mediation 
option in 1997, intending for it to “become the norm for 
resolving special education disputes” 61  and reduce the 
financial burden of pursuing due process under the IDEA.62  
Apart from mediation, within fifteen days of receiving the 
due process complaint, the district must offer the opportunity 
to arrange a resolution session.63  Parents may elect to waive 
the requirement, 64  but if they proceed and reach an 
agreement during a resolution session, the agreement is 
similarly binding in state and federal court.65   
 
III. DIFFERING RESPONSES TO IDEA LITIGATION IN NEW 
YORK CITY 
IDEA safeguards disproportionately burden low-
income families. In New York City, the majority of these 
families are non-white.  This Part will summarize racial 
segregation in the American public special education system 
                                                 
58 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5(f) (2017). 
59 § 200.5(h). 
60 Id. 
61  S. REP. NO. 105-17, at 26.  In New York state, parents rarely use 
mediation.  The most recent data provided by the U.S. Department of 
Education for 2014-2015 indicates that of the 5,170 due process complaints 
filed, only twenty resulted in a mediation session.  See U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., IDEA Section 618 Data Products: State Level Data Files, 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-data/state-level-data-
files/index.html (“Dispute Resolution” tab under “Part B”) (last visited Apr. 
12, 2018). 
62 S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 18 (1996). 
63 § 200.5(j)(2). 
64 § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV). 
65 § 200.5(j)(2) (2017). 
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and explain mayoral policy changes related to procedural 
safeguards in the City. 
A. Disparities in Special Education  
While the U.S. Department of Education releases 
data on the state level, these aggregate numbers may mask 
inequalities on the local level. Local data is not published, 
and the aggregate numbers at the state level are not broken 
down by race for every age group or socioeconomic status for 
any age group.66  Given the difficulty of collecting reliable 
local data, much of the existing literature relies on a 
patchwork of data obtained through FOIL requests and 
anecdotes. 67  New York City recently began releasing annual 
reports on the special education student population, but only 
two have been published.68 
1. Special Education as a Means of 
Segregation  
There are roughly six million children in the United 
States who receive special educational services under the 
IDEA.69  About two-thirds of these students are from families 
that make less than $50,000 per year, including the two 
million IDEA students who live below the poverty line. 70  
                                                 
66 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 61. 
67 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1426.   
68 See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOCAL LAW 27 OF 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON 
SPECIAL EDUCATION SCHOOL YEAR 2014–2015 (2016), 
http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/6035782C-F95D-4224-8372-
F2B1F7E9A226/0/LocalLaw27of20152292016FINAL.pdf; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., LOCAL LAW 27 OF 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON SPECIAL EDUCATION 




69 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 611 (see “Child Count and Educational 
Environments” tab under “Part B”). 
70 Elisa Hyman, Keeping the Needs of Students with Disabilities on the 
Agenda: Current Issues in Special Education Advocacy: How IDEA Fails 
Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of 
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While the focus of this Note is on low-income students of 
color who are correctly identified as requiring special 
education and challenges their parents face in enforcing 
their federal civil rights, any discussion on race and special 
education must first address the history of discrimination in 
the special education system:  
 
Since the landmark decision of Brown v. Board 
of Education mandated desegregation in public 
schools, African-American students have been 
re-segregated within public schools through 
their over-placement in special education 
classes.  The enforcement of Brown coincided 
with schools classifying African-American 
students as disabled and placing them in 
special education classes as a pretense for 
discrimination. 71 
 
Although scholars began to recognize the problem, 72  and 
federal courts began responding as early as the late 1960s,73 
Congress did not formally act until the 1997 IDEA 
amendments, in which Congress mandated that the National 
Research Council study minority representation in special 
education and acknowledged “that ‘more minority children 
continue to be served in special education than would be 
expected from the percentage of minority students in the 
general school population.’”74  This issue has also reached the 
attention of the U.S. Department of Education, under which 
                                                                                                         
Special Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 
112-13 (2011).   
71 Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New Idea: Shifting Educational Paradigms to 
Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1072 
(2005). 
72 Lloyd M. Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded--Is Much of It 
Justifiable?, 35 EXCEPT. CHILD. 5 (1968). 
73 In 1968, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that 
disproportionate representation of African American students in special 
education constituted an equal protection violation.  Hobson v. Hansen, 
269 F. Supp. 401, 498 (D.D.C. 1967). 
74 Garda, Jr., supra note 71, at 1076-77 (quoting PUB. L. NO. 105-17, § 
601(c)(8)(B) (1997)). 
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the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) described 
minority overrepresentation in the late 1990s as a “national 
problem” of “high priority” and acknowledged “placement in 
special education classes may be a form of discrimination.”75   
 What is particularly troubling about African 
American overrepresentation in special education is that it 
occurs most frequently in categories that require a subjective 
determination of disability, suggesting that the issue is one 
of individual and systematic bias, and not of legitimate 
health issues facing the community. 76   African American 
children are more than twice as likely to be identified as 
mentally retarded as are white children,77 more likely to be 
identified as having a severe emotional disturbance,78 and 
over twice as likely to be identified as having a broad 
development delay. 79   The consequences of 
overrepresentation are harmful to these students: African 
American children are concentrated in low-income school 
districts, where they usually receive lower-quality special 
education in large class sizes and are more likely to be placed 
in an overly restrictive environment that stunts their 
educational growth.80  Critically, African American parents – 
due to a variety of factors discussed in Section B of this Part 
– are also less likely to be successful advocates for their 
children through the IDEA due process procedures, and as a 
result, African American students placed in special education 
do not receive benefits equivalent to their white peers.81  
                                                 
75   Jane Burnette, Reducing the Disproportionate Representation of 
Minority Students in Special Education ERIC/OSEP Digest # E566 (Mar. 
1998), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED417501.pdf. 
76  Daniel Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our 
Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and 
Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 440 (2001). 
77  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN 
SPECIAL EDUC., Minority Students in Special and Gifted Education, at 44 
(2002), https://www.nap.edu/read/10128/chapter/1.  
78 Id. at 50.  
79 Id. at 60-64.  
80 Losen & Welner, supra note 76, at 427. 
81 Garda, Jr., supra note 71, at 1084. 
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 While “there is no correlation between race and 
disability,” “there is a strong correlation between race and 
poverty, and poverty and disability.”82  Still, “distortions in 
the representation of racial groups cannot be explained 
simply because minority groups are disproportionately 
represented among the poor.” 83  It is hard to explain the 
racial disparity in special education without discussing the 
history of racism in this country.  Evidence of this is 
illustrated by the fact that “five of the seven states with the 
highest overrepresentation of African Americans labeled 
‘mentally retarded’ are in the South (Mississippi, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, and Alabama) where 
intentional racial discrimination in education was once 
required by law.”84  And so even if discrimination in special 
education is waning, the residual effects are still at play.   
Cultural misunderstandings between white teachers 
and their African American students, for example, “may 
result in those teachers perceiving students to be 
oppositional or incapable of understanding what is required 
of them.”85  Various studies have confirmed “teachers view 
the exact same behavior by white and black students 
differently” resulting in “a referral for special education 
assessment, and almost certainly placement, to remove the 
culturally different – or ‘disruptive’ – behavior from the 
classroom.”86  As the research indicates, “teachers tend to 
more frequently refer students from backgrounds different 
than their own”, 87  resulting in white teachers referring 
African American students to special education at a higher 
                                                 
82 Garda, Jr., supra note 71, at 1086 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 99 
(2003)). 
83 Losen & Welner, supra note 76, at 415. 
84  Id. at 414; See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 77, at 63 (finding “clearly 
there is overrepresentation for these two minorities in the LD category in 
some states”). 
85 Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled 
Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1320 (1995). 
86 Garda, Jr., supra note 71, at 1091-92. 
87  Patrick Linehan, Guarding the Dumping Ground: Equal Protection, 
Title VII and Justifying the Use of Race in the Hiring of Special Educators, 
2001 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 179, 190 (2001). 
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rate than do their non-white colleagues.  And so, while many 
of the problems in special education correlate with 
socioeconomic status, racism has made those problems worse 
for students of color. 
2. Educational Disparities in New York 
City Public Schools 
New York state has one of the most racially 
segregated public school system in the country.88  In New 
York City, as of 2014, 19 out of the 32 Community School 
Districts had a student body of which less than 10% were 
white.89  Of the City’s charter schools, 73% have less than 1% 
white enrollment and 90% have less than 10% white 
enrollment.90 
Despite a reputation of inclusivity and progressivism, 
the City, along with most of the American Northeast, has a 
complicated history with integration.  Prior to the start of the 
school integration movement in 1954, the most recent report 
on issues facing minority students in City public schools was 
published in 1915.91  The City Board of Education took its 
first concrete steps to initiate integration in 1954 by issuing 
a strong statement pledging to eliminate de facto segregation 
in public schools and creating positions within the Board 
responsible for carrying out that mission. 92   A study 
published in the fall of 1955 illustrated that roughly eight 
percent of City public schools were 90 percent or more non-
white, and compared to schools that were over 90 percent 
                                                 
88 THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 2; See also, Niraj Chokshi, The 
most segregated schools may not be in the states you’d expect, WASH. POST 
(May 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/05/15/the-most-
segregated-schools-may-not-be-in-the-states-youd-expect-
2/?utm_term=.84fc1dabff70 [https://perma.cc/97VA-NNAZ].  
89 THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 2. 
90 Id. 
91 Diane Ravitch, A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 251 
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 3rd ed. 2000); See also Frances Blascoer, 
Colored School Children in New York, NEW YORK: PUBLIC EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION (1915). 
92 Ravitch, supra note 91, at 252-53. 
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white, the majority non-white schools were older, more 
poorly maintained, and staffed with less experienced 
teachers. 93  When the Board began measures to integrate 
schools, white parents strongly resisted, including one 
demonstration in Queens that resulted in almost half of the 
white student body skipping school to protest a new busing 
policy. 94   Parental protests resulted in decentralizing 
education policymaking authority and halting integration 
efforts.95  The failure to better integrate students of diverse 
backgrounds amplifies the problems in the City’s special 
education system.   
New York City Department of Education officials 
“responsible for IDEA compliance consistently fail in this 
basic mission” and the district is “fraught with enormous 
organizational obstacles to effective and efficient change.”96  
The problem is compounded by the fact that disability 
classification in New York state is higher than the national 
average: As of 2014, 13% of the American student population 
have a qualifying disability under the IDEA, while the 
number in New York state is 15.7%.97  In New York City, as 
of 2017, about 25% of the student population have a 
qualifying IDEA disability. 98   In addition to the above-
average levels of disability classification, New York also 
makes up a disproportionately large share of IDEA 
procedural safeguard activity: Due process complaints filed 
in New York state make up almost one-third of the total due 
                                                 
93 Id., at 253. 
94 Id., at 259. 
95  Clarence Taylor, KNOCKING AT OUR OWN DOOR: MILTON A. GALAMISON 
AND THE STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS, at 120-23, 157, 
180-207 (Colum. Univ. Press 1997).  
96 Tulman, supra note 22, at 266. 
97  Identification of Children with Disabilities, New York (2014), 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/specialed/spp/osepdeterminations/NY-acc-
statedatadisplay-2014.pdf.      
98 According to the 2017 Preliminary Mayor’s Management Report, out of 
the 1,134,000 students age 3-21 in New York City, 283,017 receive special 
education services. This number includes the 31,262 children who receive 
special education services in pre-school.  THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT, at 191-92 (February 2017), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/pmmr2017/2017_pm
mr.pdf.  
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process complaints filed in the United States.99  Put another 
way, parents file due process complaints in New York over 
four times as much as they do nationally. 100   By one 
estimate, New York City makes up 94.8% of those filed 
within the state.101   
 There are several factors that may contribute to New 
York’s outlier status in IDEA activity.  New York City is 
engaged in a nearly four decade-long legal battle with a 
group of parents and non-profit organizations seeking to 
alleviate the City’s history of neglect towards children with 
special needs pertaining to their evaluation, transportation, 
and placement. 102   Under a 1982 order from the Jose P. 
litigation, the City must offer a family of a child with special 
needs a placement in a state-approved nonpublic school at 
the City’s expense if the City fails to provide a free and 
appropriate public education placement within sixty days of 
that child’s referral to special education. 103  In effect, the 
order operates as a de facto voucher program.104  The City 
must also pay for the independent evaluation of the child if 
the City fails to do so within 30 days of referral. 105   In 
                                                 
99 The exact figure is 30.22% for the 2014-2015 school year, during which 
parents in New York filed 5,170 due process complaints, while the number 
on the national level was 17,107.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 61 
(“Child Count and Educational Environments” and “Dispute Resolution” 
tabs under “Part B”). 
100 For the 2014-2015 school year, 1.03% of students in New York state 
filed complaints under the IDEA (5,170 complaints for the 499,551 
students in special education within the state) while only 0.25% of 
students filed complaints nationally (17,107 complaints for the 6,814,410 
students in special education in the entire country). U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
supra note 61 (“Child Count and Educational Environments” and “Dispute 
Resolution” tabs under “Part B”). 
101 McMahon, supra note 50. This statistic is based on data from 2002-2003 
school year through the 2009-2010 school year that the author obtained 
through Freedom of Information Law requests in New York state. 
102 For list of relevant stipulations and orders from the litigation over the 
last 40 years, see ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, JOSE P. V. MILLS, 
http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/litigation/class_actions/jose_p_vs_mill
s. 
103 Jose P. v. Ambach, 557 F. Supp. 1230, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
104 Unlike New York, several states have formally established state special 
education voucher programs. These are discussed in Part III of this Note. 
105 Jose P., 557 F. Supp. 1230 at 1241. 
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addition to the 1982 order, the City’s “historical refusal to 
enter into multi-year settlements” is likely another factor 
contributing to the high levels of IDEA activity.106  A parent 
who successfully litigated a tuition reimbursement claim for 
one year would have to relitigate the issue for the following 
year, even if their child’s IEP had not significantly 
changed.107   
New York’s higher-than-average IDEA activity is not 
distributed equally: The educational geographic districts that 
have the most due process activity are significantly more 
wealthy and more white than the City as a whole; such 
districts encompass neighborhoods like the Upper East Side, 
the Upper West Side, the West Village, and Park Slope.108  
Parents in the City experience great success in pursuing 
their due process complaints at the initial level with an 
Impartial Hearing Officer: 72% win the entirety of their 
complaint while an additional 11% win a partial victory.109  
At the second level with the State Review Officer, however, 
the City wins 80% of the time.110  Parental success at the 
IHO level does not seem to follow from recent Congressional 
reforms as 35% of parents went straight to an impartial 
                                                 
106 Tulman, supra note 22, at 270.   
107 Mayor De Blasio ended this practice in 2014, and it will be interesting 
to observe what effects, if any, this decision will have on the level of IDEA 
activity. Al Baker, De Blasio Offers Easier Access to City Money for Special 




108  The data from McMahon, supra note 50 identifies the most active 
school districts.  To match the district number with the corresponding 
neighborhood, see N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL SEARCH, 
http://schools.nyc.gov/schoolsearch/.  To compare data on socioeconomic 
status and race within City neighborhoods, see Emma Whitford, 
Interactive Maps Show Racial & Socioeconomic Segregation Of NYC 
Schools, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 16, 2015), 
http://gothamist.com/2015/12/16/education_segregation_map.php#photo-1 
[https://perma.cc/34HH-2479].  
109 Tulman, supra note 22, at 268.   
110 Geoff Decker, Advocates say city is agreeing to pay special ed costs less 
often, CHALKBEAT (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/ny/2013/08/28/advocates-say-city-is-
agreeing-to-pay-special-ed-costs-less-often/ [https://perma.cc/C7E2-A9PN].  
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hearing because the city failed to schedule a resolution 
session within the required time, and an additional 41% of 
parents waived the resolution session.111  The rate at which 
parents avoid resolution sessions in the City is higher than 
other jurisdictions, which may be due to the City’s failure to 
comply with the IDEA requirement that the district 
representative in a resolution hearing have settlement 
authority.112  The rate of parental failure with State Review 
Officers illustrates the financial barrier facing parents: In 
order to be successful in an appeal of a SRO decision to the 
courts, a parent will likely need to hire an attorney and pay 
upfront retainer fees. 
B. Inequalities of Private Enforcement Use and 
Education Quality 
The increased level of IDEA activity in New York 
warrants scrutiny of whether the mechanism is properly 
working to ensure every child with a qualifying disability has 
access to a FAPE as Congress desired.  There are two main 
criticisms of the operational reality of the private 
enforcement system, each reinforcing each other: Primarily, 
only wealthy families can afford, or have the institutional 
knowledge and personal time to pursue, private enforcement 
of the IDEA, and their success in doing so drains resources 
out of the public education system from which less affluent, 
disproportionally non-white, students then receive even 
lower quality care.113   
The notion that tuition reimbursement claims drain 
public resources is hotly contested. Many argue that the 
reimbursement is nearly analogous to the amount the City 
would be paying anyway had the child remained in public 
school or that the resources diverted to private institutions 
will only motive public schools to be more efficient in their 
                                                 
111 Tulman, supra note 22, at 268.   
112 Id. at 269.   
113 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1419; Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A Poor 
Idea: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement Second-Class Remedial 
Scheme for Low-Income Children with Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599, 623 (2013). 
422 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
 
budgeting. 114   Even if this is true, the argument fails to 
address the fixed costs of running a large public education 
system, or that private schools may pick and choose which 
services they want to offer while the public system must 
provide services for a wide range of disabilities, from those 
that require a minor cost to those that are more expensive.115  
Regardless of the debate over resources, the layers of 
bureaucracy that make up the IDEA procedural safeguards, 
while designed to empower parents, carry burdens that 
disproportionately impact low-income parents.  Academic 
criticism of the disparities created by the private 
enforcement system is not new; studies began raising this 
concern as early as the 1980s.116  In order to understand why 
disparities exist in the private enforcement system, it may be 
helpful to walk through the challenges of successfully 
navigating through the IDEA’s procedural safeguards and 
discuss how each of those challenges are more difficult for 
less affluent parents who, in New York City, are 
disproportionately non-white.117   
                                                 
114  Jay P. Greene, The Case for Special Education Vouchers, THE 
MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 7, 2009), https://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/case-special-education-vouchers-2055.html 
[https://perma.cc/JM95-48KN]. 
115 NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, Vouchers? No, There are Better Alternatives (2009), 
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/PB07a_Vouchers_Alternative09.pdf (noting 
that “[b]ecause school districts are unable to reduce fixed costs such as 
salaries and benefits for staff, transportation services, maintenance, 
utilities, and supplies, they do not benefit financially when a few students 
spread across different grade levels leave a public school for a voucher 
school. Instead, those students take their entire per pupil expenditure 
with them, leaving the school to fund its programs and staff with fewer 
public dollars.”); Jay P. Greene, Fixing Special Education, 82 PEABODY J. 
EDUC. 703, 709-710 (Oct. 2007) (noting that in special education, “most 
administrative expenses are fixed costs that do not increase with every 
new child. Schools need administrators, secretaries, psychologists, speech 
therapists, and other specialists, whether their special-education caseload 
is low or high.”). 
116  See, e.g., David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization 
Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
63 (Winter 1985). 
117 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS BY 
RACE/HISPANIC ORIGIN AND ANCESTRY GROUP, at 15 (2005) 
No. 4:398]          SOCIOECONOMIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 423 
 
1. Attending the CSE Meeting 
The contents of an IEP strongly influence a child’s 
educational outcome.  It is perhaps the most consequential 
opportunity for parental involvement under the IDEA, as the 
IEP will govern where the child goes to school and what 
services should be provided to that child.  But in order to 
secure a better outcome for their child with a strong IEP, 
parents must first have the scheduling flexibility to attend 
the CSE meetings.  Unfortunately, instead of reaching out to 
parents to coordinate a mutually convenient time to schedule 
a CSE meeting, school administrators will “frequently” “send 
home written notice, often in a child's backpack, that a 
meeting has been scheduled at a time pre-selected by the 
school.” 118   Law professors involved in special education 
clinical work note that if the parent is not able to attend, “it 
is not uncommon for the meeting to be held without his or 
her participation,” but there does not appear to be formally 
published data to assess the validity of this claim in New 
York City.119  Still, even if a school administrator does reach 
out to a parent to schedule a mutually acceptable time, doing 
so is difficult, particularly for low-income parents who may 
need to work multiple jobs to financially support themselves 
and their children, and as a result have inflexible 
schedules.120 
2. Lack of Institutional Knowledge 
Instead of robust dialogues about what is in the best 
interest of the child between parties with the sufficient 
information to have such a discussion, as the IDEA 
envisions, “conferences have become highly formal, non-
                                                                                                         
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-
population/acs/acs_socio_05_nyc.pdf. 
118 Yael Cannon, Michael Gregory, & Julie Waterstone, A Solution Hiding 
in Plain Sight: Special Education and Better Outcomes for Students with 
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interactive, and replete with educational jargon.”121  If the 
parent is able to attend the CSE meeting, they must have 
the institutional knowledge necessary to craft a strong IEP 
for their child.  Part of that responsibility includes being able 
to identify suboptimal programming when it is offered and 
push back against it, but many parents lack sufficient 
training to assess the merits of various options. 
The informational asymmetry is debilitating for 
parents.  Administrators’ frequent participation in this 
process has allowed them to develop a level of expertise, 
while parents are usually participating for the first time. 122  
Given this reality, “parents are often not fully aware of 
educational options available for their children and therefore 
have a difficult time forming accurate expectations of schools 
and teachers.” 123   Given that IEPs are protected student 
records under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA),124 the services that one child receives is not 
available to other parents for which to compare their own 
child’s services, making it “hard for an unknowledgeable 
parent to determine the universe of services to ask for.”125  
Here again, socioeconomic status sets a divergent course as 
“parents are left to call on their own informational networks 
to determine what services to ask for and when bringing a 
claim is necessary to enforce their rights effectively.” 126  
Wealthier parents have broader geographical networks from 
which they can request information and assistance through 
this process, while the networks of less affluent parents are 
generally limited by geography and to other people of lower 
socioeconomic status who are likely to have less knowledge 
or expertise on the subject.127  
                                                 
121 Kotler, supra note 4, at 364 (internal citation omitted). 
122 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1442.   
123  Erin Phillips, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in 
Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1830 (2008). 
124 Matter of Huseman v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 30959, slip op. at 12-
13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). 
125 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1437 (2011).   
126 Id.   
127 John Field, SOCIAL CAPITAL, at 82-91 (2d ed. 2008). 
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Even if a parent does have the necessary information 
to be an informed advocate, the CSE meeting is an 
intimidating experience.  Parents enter a room with 
unfamiliar experts and bureaucrats, and then must 
challenge their expertise to secure an outcome that the 
parent thinks is best.  Many parents “describe themselves as 
terrified and inarticulate.” 128   There are also important 
interpersonal constrains as “parents often feel hindered in 
challenging the school district’s services due to a fear of 
injuring their relationships with the educators who are likely 
to remain a part of their child’s education on a daily basis, 
whether they win or lose the challenge.”129 
3. Inability to Assess the Adequacy of 
Public School Placement 
 It is difficult for parents to properly assess if the 
services that their child is receiving are sufficient to 
constitute a FAPE.  Frequently, parents, to no fault of their 
own, are “incapable of judging outcomes” of their child’s 
educational progress. 130   Most parents are not trained in 
special education policy.  If a parent has unrealistically high 
expectations, they may be unable to appreciate the extent to 
which their child is progressing if the outcomes do not meet 
the parent’s expectation. 131   Conversely, and “[m]ore 
commonly, parents are too accepting of poor outcomes, 
tending to praise even poor programming, since they lack the 
awareness of what constitutes good programming.”132  Here, 
strong informational networks can again assist parents in 
determining if there is a problem that should be addressed, 
but as explained above, less affluent families have weaker 
informational networks on which to rely.  
                                                 
128 Phillips, supra note 123, at 1834. 
129 Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Reality Over Ideology: A Practical View of 
Special Needs Voucher Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REv. 53, 61 (2014).   
130 Kotler, supra note 4, at 373-74. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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4. Time and Financial Demands 
 Even if a parent does determine that their child’s 
public school placement is inadequate, filing a due process 
complaint to secure a remedy is a time-consuming and 
expensive endeavor.  Put simply, lower income “parents of 
disabled students are much more likely to have difficulty 
advocating effectively for their children” as “impoverishment 
forces parents to work more jobs and spend more time 
outside the home,” leaving less time to navigate through the 
bureaucratic maze that is the IDEA due process 
procedure.133 
 The financial costs are two-fold:  First, there are 
upfront financial costs in hiring an attorney to litigate a case 
(as well as the risk of having to pay those costs in full if the 
parent loses) and any relevant experts a parent may need to 
testify throughout process.  Second, if a parent does 
unilaterally take their child out of the public school system, 
they must have the funding to pay for the initial deposit for a 
private school and the financial stability to risk doing so in 
case their claim for tuition reimbursement fails.  This is a 
significant financial risk as tuition at several New York City 
private special education schools can exceed $80,000 a 
year.134   
 Congress and the Supreme Court have acted to ease 
the financial burden on parents, but the efforts have had 
limited practical effect.  A parent may recover attorney fees, 
but only if they are successful in their reimbursement 
                                                 
133 Phillips, supra note 123, at 1834-36. 
134 In a recent federal case in New York, a parent made a successful tuition 
reimbursement claim against the City for the expense of a private school 
that charged an annual $84,900 tuition fee.  A ex rel. D.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The City argued that 
the parent could not make such a claim because the parent had only made 
a nominal contribution to the tuition bill, but the Court disagreed, holding 
that the parent may make a claim for retroactive tuition reimbursement, 
even if the parent did not yet actually make the payment. This case is 
significant because it is the first federal court in the City to endorse the 
legality of tuition reimbursement for private schools, like the one at issue 
in the case, that seek to provide flexibility for parents in creating payment 
plans.  
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claim.135  The cost of hiring experts necessary to effectively 
make the parent’s case, however, cannot be recovered. 136  
Further, the scope of attorney fees that are recoverable is 
limited.  Parents can collect for services during litigation, but 
not for attorney services during the CSE meetings, during 
which the crucial formulation of the IEP occurs. 137  As a 
result, families that can afford to hire an attorney for the 
CSE meeting may receive stronger IEPs for their children, 
while parents who cannot do so are without recourse.  
C. New York City Mayoral Responses to Tuition 
Reimbursement Claims 
Prior to the election of Bill De Blasio as Mayor of New 
York City in 2013, the City government was publicly hostile 
to tuition reimbursement claims under the IDEA.  Harold 
Levy, the Chancellor of the City’s Board of Education during 
the first several months of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
tenure, criticized the use of the IDEA private enforcement 
mechanism by wealthy parents during his testimony for an 
April 2002 hearing of the President’s Commission on 
Excellence in Special Education. 138   According to Levy, 
wealthy parents who pursue private enforcement “drained 
resources that are critically needed” for the public education 
system, resulting in an inequitable distribution of services; 
summarizing his dissatisfaction, and perhaps intentionally 
drawing on racial overtones, Levy said, “You cannot give one 
kid the Cadillac and the others the back of the bus.”139   
Members of the Bloomberg administration claim to 
have “scrutinized requests to weed out families who were 
                                                 
135 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 
(2006). 
136 Id. 
137 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) (2012). 
138  Yilu Zhao, Rich Disabled Pupils Go to Private Schools at Public 
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simply trying to get free private schooling, when public 
schools could meet their needs.”140  By the end of 2007, the 
City under Bloomberg began “significantly ramping up its 
effort to challenge cases in which it pays for private school 
tuition of children with disabilities whose parents say they 
are ill-served by the public schools.”141  The City Department 
of Education enlisted the help of a consulting firm to cut 
$200 million from the budget, in part by more rigorously 
defending tuition reimbursement claims. 142   Special 
education advocates argued, “the more combative process has 
created a scenario in which only parents with means, 
resources, and knowledge of the system are most prepared to 
handle a gauntlet of steps.”143  In response to the contention 
that the City’s reimbursement budget had significantly 
increased due to a poorly staffed legal team, executive 
director of Advocates for Children, Kim Sweet, said “I don’t 
think they are paying private school tuition because they 
don’t have good lawyers … I think they lose these hearings 
because they don’t have good programs … I would rather see 
them pour resources into special education services than 
lawyers.”144  
 Mayor De Blasio has taken a different approach to the 
issue than his predecessor.  In April 2014, the Mayor 
announced reforms to ease the burden on parents of children 
with disabilities in pursuing their due process rights. 145  
While noting that the City still reserves the right to litigate 
meritless claims, De Blasio announced that the City will now 
seek to resolve disputes through settlement within fifteen 
                                                 
140 Al Baker, Balancing Special-Education Needs with Rising Costs, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 28, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/nyregion/28specialed.html 
[https://perma.cc/JV2L-F7BT]. 
141 Elissa Gootman, In Special Education Cases, City Is Fighting Harder 




143 Decker, supra note 110.  
144 Gootman, supra note 141. 
145 Baker, supra note 107. 
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days of receiving a complaint.146  Further, parents who do 
receive reimbursement need only resubmit relevant 
paperwork every three years, instead of annually, and so 
long as a child’s educational needs do not change 
significantly, that child can remain in their non-public 
placement without the parents having to file a new 
complaint for each academic year.147  According to De Blasio, 
Bloomberg’s approach may have been a “good litigation 
strategy, but it was not a humane way to run a school 
system.” 148  Instead, De Blasio called for a more “family-
friendly, respectful approach that didn’t matter how good 
your lawyers were, or how much money you had to spend on 
lawyers, but actually tried to address the family’s needs.”149  
When asked about the potential increase in spending that 
would result, De Blasio replied, “if there is an additional 
cost, it’s appropriate because we’re serving the families more 
fairly.”150   
 The increase in spending has indeed been 
significant.151  In 2016, the City paid $256 million in tuition 
reimbursement claims, which is over six times the roughly 
$40 million amount the City paid in 2009 when De Blasio 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Patrick Wall, City Agrees to Ease Process for Special Needs Students 
Seeking Private School Tuition, CHALKBEAT (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/ny/2014/06/24/city-agrees-to-ease-process-
for-special-needs-students-seeking-private-school-tuition/. 
149  Alex Zimmerman, The City is Paying for more Students with 
Disabilities to Attend Private School; Advocates Say Problems Persist, 




150 Wall, supra note 148. 
151 Determining the exact dollar amount that the City pays out for tuition 
reimbursement claims is difficult.  There is a large discrepancy between 
figures published in the newspapers, by the City Council, and by the City’s 
Comptroller’s Office.  Given that the Comptroller has the authority to 
settle or adjust all claims against the City, this Note will use figures from 
the Comptroller’s Annual Claims Report.  See New York City Charter § 
93(i). 
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was first elected mayor. 152   The 2009 figure may be 
artificially depressed by Bloomberg’s aggressive push to 
decrease such spending, but the 2016 figure is still nearly 
double the roughly $130 million the City paid in 2014,153 and 
significantly more than the $106 million the City paid in 
2013.154  Due process complaints are also on the rise.  The 
number of claims filed in the City doubled between 2013 
(2,097 claims) and 2015 (4,475 claims), before plateauing in 
2016 (4,091 claims).155  The oddity of this situation is that 
while reimbursements and claims may be on the rise, the 
number of IDEA tuition reimbursement claims against the 
City that are actually litigated in federal court is 
decreasing.156  This suggests that parents may be becoming 
more successful in the state administrative hearing level 
with either the IHO or SRO, perhaps an indirect effect of De 
Blasio’s policy. 
 Despite these changes, problems still persist.  During 
the 2014-2015 school year, 35% of students were only 
partially receiving the services proscribed in their IEP and 
an additional 5% of students were not receiving any services 
proscribed by their IEP.157  During the following year, those 
numbers were 33% and 8%, respectively.158 
                                                 
152 OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 
at 23 (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Claims-Report-
FY-2016.pdf; OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS REPORT: FISCAL 
YEARS 2009 & 2010, at 64 (June 15, 2011), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/documents/2011_Claims_Report.pdf. 
153 OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015, 
at 23 (June 15, 2016), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/documents/Claims_Report_FY_2015.pdf. 
154 Id. 
155 OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, supra note 152, at 22 (Feb. 10, 
2017).  
156 According to a search of the U.S. Federal District Court docket in the 
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York in Bloomberg Law, only one 
tuition reimbursement claim was filed against the City between April 
2014, when De Blasio first announced his new policy, to March 2017, the 
time at which this Note was completed.   
157 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., Local Law 27 of 2015 Annual Report on Special 
Education School Year 2014–2015, at 23 (Feb. 29, 2016), 
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Even more concerning, “the department said that its 
data systems were so unreliable that it was not exactly sure 
what percentage of students were not receiving the 
services.”159  De Blasio’s reforms may have eased some of the 
financial burdens facing parents who have initiated IDEA 
due process procedures, but the changes have not alleviated 
the structural disadvantages of the process, nor have they 
solved the deficiencies in the City’s public special education 
system.  Apart from reforms the City could initiate to 
improve the quality of such programs and improve the 
means of collecting reliable data to track those programs’ 
progress, the City should improve parental experience with 
the IDEA’s procedural safeguards, so that quality special 
education is more equitably distributed among children in 
need.  
IV. SECURING QUALITY SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR EACH 
NEW YORK CITY CHILD  
The purpose of this Note is to highlight how issues 
stemming from the IDEA’s private enforcement mechanism 
manifest on the municipal level in New York City. This Part 
will highlight reforms that can be achieved within local 
government, as opposed to a reform that would require 
Congressional or federal agency action.  Additionally, this 
part will discuss the merits and drawbacks of three popular 
reform suggestions: voucher programs, state-funded legal 
assistance, and public enforcement of the IDEA. 
                                                                                                         
http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/6035782C-F95D-4224-8372-
F2B1F7E9A226/0/LocalLaw27of20152292016FINAL.pdf. 
158 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., Local Law 27 of 2015 Annual Report on Special 
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A. Vouchers 
Few areas of education policy are as controversial as 
the issue of publicly funded school vouchers, but for reasons 
discussed in this section, establishing a formal state 
education voucher program is not the best way to achieve the 
IDEA’s statutory goals within New York City. 
1. A Brief Explanation of Vouchers and 
School Choice  
The nomination and confirmation of Betsy DeVos as 
Secretary of Education reignited the school voucher debate 
on the national level.  The confirmation hearing, notoriously, 
went very poorly.160  DeVos’ remarks on special education 
were perhaps the most troubling aspect of her hearing, as it 
illustrated the now-Secretary’s lack of awareness of basic 
protections for students with special needs under the 
IDEA.161  In response to the criticism, DeVos claims to have 
simply been “confused” by the question.162 
Senator Maggie Hassan of New Hampshire, who is 
the mother of a son with a qualifying disability under the 
IDEA, asked DeVos on her view of special education voucher 
programs; specifically, whether or not private institutions 
that accept vouchers should be allowed to waive IDEA 
protections so that students no longer have recourse in the 
                                                 
160 Kate Zernike & Yamiche Alcindor, Betsy DeVos’s Education Hearing 
Erupts Into Partisan Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-
senate-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/QY87-ADCG].  
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courts to enforce their federal special education rights. 163  
Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, who Hillary Clinton selected 
to be her Vice Presidential nominee during the 2016 election, 
asked DeVos, “Should all schools that receive taxpayer 
funding be required to meet the requirements of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?” 164   DeVos 
replied that the matter is best left to the states.165  Both of 
DeVos’ answers appeared to indicate that she was unaware 
of the procedural safeguards under the IDEA and that, as a 
federal law, those safeguards preempt a state’s ability to 
provide protections less than what the federal statute 
requires.166   
Despite these troubling exchanges, DeVos is now the 
Secretary Education and will presumably serve in the 
position for at least the next four years.167  As a result, the 
issue of vouchers is likely to become more prominent as 
DeVos, a champion of the so-called school choice movement, 
leads the U.S. Department of Education.  Discussions on 
special education reform must at least acknowledge this 
reality.   
Members of the school choice movement, like DeVos, 
are eager to point out the shortcomings of public education.  
They argue that children caught up in public schools that fail 
                                                 
163 Senator Maggie Hassan, DeVos Refuses to Answer Senator Hassan’s 
Question on Protecting Students with Disabilities, YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fftskn5HFdA.  
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to adequately perform cannot wait until the public education 
system is reformed.  Instead, they argue that the government 
should fund many of these students’ education at a private or 
charter institution through school vouchers to ensure the 
students can obtain the best education possible.168  Some in 
the school choice movement may have an ideological 
opposition to public education, and to the restrictions on the 
inclusion of religion in public school curriculums.169  Other 
supporters of the movement claim to have a more time-
focused perspective rooted in a sense of urgency: There exists 
a finite window of time where a child will benefit from a 
quality education, and if that opportunity passes, the 
damage may be difficult to undo.  This argument becomes 
more pronounced for students with disabilities, particularly 
those with autism.  Like all children, those with autism “will 
benefit from early and appropriate services,” although for 
children with autism, “the window of opportunity is widest 
when the child is young, and the damage to the child's 
development if this opportunity is not seized can never be 
undone.”170  Underfunded public schools may lack sufficient 
resources to meet this need as services “tend to be scattered, 
fragmented, and poorly coordinated.”171 
The degree to which the school choice debate has 
become contentious is difficult to overstate.  Teachers 
Unions, for example, view the increased use of vouchers as 
an existential threat; schools that accept vouchers, unlike 
New York City public schools, often do not have a unionized 
                                                 
168 Greene, supra note 114. 
169  See, e.g., Tammy Harel Ben Shahar, Race, Class, and Religion: 
Creaming and Cropping in Religious, Ethnic, and Cultural Charter 
Schools, 7:1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 20 (2016) (noting “religious 
communities have adopted practical alternatives to fund religious 
schooling, such as voucher programs that direct public funding to private 
schools through parental choice.”). 
170 Amicus Curiae Brief of Autism Speaks as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 25, Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New 
York v. Tom F., 552 U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 06-637).. 
171 Id., at 17 quoting Autism Spectrum Disorder Expert Working Group, 
Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee, National Institute of Mental 
Health, Department of Health and Human Services, Autism Spectrum 
Disorders Roadmap (May 16, 2005) at 3. 
No. 4:398]          SOCIOECONOMIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 435 
 
faculty. 172   But the opposition to vouchers goes beyond 
organized interest groups.  Some maintain an ideological 
opposition to the use of vouchers, arguing they undermine 
the promise of universal public education. 173   Research 
appears to support this argument: Recently, “[t]hree 
consecutive reports, each studying one of the largest new 
state voucher programs, found that vouchers hurt student 
learning.”174  Even in the instances where proponents can 
point to the success of school vouchers, it is important to 
remember that the pool of students within these schools are 
self-selected by highly motivated parents who are already 
likely to be very involved in their child’s education.  Securing 
a spot in many of the prized charter schools or obtaining a 
voucher requires diligent effort on the part of the parent, so 
that “those who are better educated, involved and motivated, 
and those who are better connected, make better educational 
choices for their children.” 175   And so even if a voucher 
program is successful, it is difficult to scale up a program 
that relies so heavily on a self-selected pool of parents and 
children.176    
Funding for vouchers come from the general public 
education budget, so not only do the use of vouchers further 
partition access to education by dividing the student 
population between public school students and voucher 
                                                 
172 NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 115. 
173 Strauss, supra note 162. 
174 Kevin Carey, Dismal Voucher Results Surprise Researchers as DeVos 
Era Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/upshot/dismal-results-from-vouchers-
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students, “vouchers divert much-needed resources away from 
public schools and re-route it to private and religious 
schools.”177  This claim echoes the criticism of the private 
enforcement mechanism under the IDEA. 
2. State Special Education Voucher 
Programs 
During DeVos’ confirmation hearing, both she and 
Senator Hassan cited state special education voucher 
programs in furtherance of their respective policy visions.  
DeVos mentioned a program in Ohio as a model of success for 
state special education voucher programs, and even brought 
an alumnus of the school to her hearing.178  Senator Hassan 
noted a program in Florida that requires students to sign 
away IDEA rights upon receipt of the voucher, which the 
Senator described as “fundamentally wrong.”179  
Over half a dozen states run special education 
voucher programs, and similar proposals exist in an 
additional dozen states.180  While “these programs differ in 
various respects, the essential element in each program is 
the ability of children with special needs to leave their public 
school and use funds otherwise intended for their public 
education to attend a private school of their choice.”181   
Proponents of increased use of special education 
vouchers cite parental satisfaction as a primary rationale for 
expanding similar programs.  In defending the McKay 
scholarship program to Senator Hassan, for example, DeVos 
cited a statistic showing overwhelming parental approval.182  
DeVos is correct: Studies of special education voucher 
                                                 
177 Valerie Strauss, The Case Against School Vouchers: Sen. Patty Murray 
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programs in Utah and Florida have produced “clear evidence 
suggesting that special needs vouchers are popular with 
many parents of children with disabilities, and the 
overwhelming majority of voucher participants are pleased 
with these programs.”183  Advocates argue that parents, not 
educational bureaucracies, are best situated to evaluate their 
children’s progress, and thus parental satisfaction of voucher 
programs illustrate the need to expand them:  
Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their 
children and considerable knowledge of their 
particular needs make parents the child-
specific experts most qualified to assess and 
pursue their children’s best interests in most 
circumstances. In contrast, the state’s 
knowledge of and commitment to any 
particular child is relatively thin. 184 
 
As discussed earlier in this Note, however, parents may not 
always be best suited to make evaluative determinations, 
particularly those who do not have the luxury of time to 
devote to such an important task or the strong informational 
networks to inform their conclusions.  But even if every 
parent had the necessary time and institutional knowledge 
to effectively advocate on behalf of their child, many private 
institutions do not provide the same evaluative tools as do 
public institutions, meaning that parents are left to make 
their evaluations on subjective determinations that are often 
irrelevant to their child’s educational progress. 185   Many 
private institutions, for instance, do not administer 
standardized testing to monitor student educational progress 
or even require that their teachers complete training in 
                                                 
183 Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of 
Special Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 333 (2010). 
184 Emily Buss, “Parental Rights”, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 647 (2002). 
185 Adamo Usman, supra note 129, at 76.  
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special educational services,186 although New York state does 
require both.187   
Florida runs the oldest special education voucher 
program in the United States, the McKay Scholarship 
Program for Students with Disabilities, and “there are 
reports of McKay scholarship students who received high 
grades in private schools only to find that they were several 
grade levels behind when returning to public school.” 188  
School choice advocates argue such problems can be 
alleviated with additional legislative reforms and are not 
inherent to voucher programs generally.  The McKay 
Program was fraught with corruption and fraudulent activity 
in the early years of its operation, but legislative reforms 
subsequent to the program’s inception have mitigated the 
extent to which such problems exist. 189  Still, the lack of 
sufficient oversight is merely a part of the problem with 
expanding special education voucher programs.   
A larger issue with voucher programs is the 
implications they have on students’ federal IDEA rights.  In 
1990, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) under the U.S. 
Department of Education indicated that students who 
participate in state voucher programs that are not funded 
with federal special education funding waive the protections 
afforded to them under the IDEA, that is, they are no longer 
entitled to a free and appropriate education or a program 
that conforms with their IEP.190  The OCR reiterated this 
position in 2004, noting that if a school district offers a free 
and appropriate education under the IDEA but a parent still 
elects to send their child to private school, that child has “no 
individual entitlement to a free appropriate public education 
including special education and related services in 
                                                 
186 Id. 
187  § 200.7(b)(6); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS, at 196 (2009), 
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf.  
188 Hensel, supra note 183, at 335. 
189 Adamo Usman, supra note 129, at 65.   
190 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STAFF MEMORANDUM, 22 
IDELR 669, 670 (July 27, 1990).  
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connection” with that private school.191  This decision means 
that by accepting a special needs voucher, a parent 
“effectively waives all meaningful protection under the IDEA 
for his or her child.”192  
The waiver of IDEA rights is not insignificant.  Once 
such rights are waived, “if the education the student receives 
at the private school is not adequate, the student has no 
legal recourse under the IDEA against either the private 
school or the state.” 193  Some proponents of these programs 
note the option parents have to always re-enroll their child 
back in public schools to regain IDEA rights, if desired.194  
But such an argument is somewhat circular, as it 
undermines the time urgency rationale at the heart of the 
school choice movement.  Furthermore, this is exactly the 
situation that Senator Hassan warned about in DeVos’ 
confirmation hearing, when the Senator noted that such 
situations would result in “turning our public schools into 
warehouses” for the kids with the most challenging 
disabilities or the “kids whose parents cannot afford to make 
up the difference between the voucher and private school’s 
tuition.”195 
Creating a special education voucher program in New 
York is the wrong solution for the problems outlined in this 
Note.  The informal system created by the Jose P. litigation, 
while effectively a de facto voucher program, is different from 
other existing state programs for two important reasons.  
First, when the City fails to provide a school placement for a 
child in a timely manner, under Jose P., the City must then 
pay for that child’s education at a state-approved non-public 
school. 196   These institutions are critically different from 
other private institutions, at which parents pay to send their 
children with their own money, a successful tuition 
reimbursement claim, or in states that have such programs, 
                                                 
191 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LETTER TO BOWEN, 35 
IDELR 129, 130 (March 23, 2001).  
192 Hensel, supra note 183, at 317. 
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a school voucher.  State approved non-public schools, unlike 
other private schools, are more heavily regulated and 
students maintain their IDEA rights while attending. 197  
Second, Jose P., was established as a temporary response to 
a failing, underfunded system.198  By establishing a formal 
special education voucher program, the City would 
essentially be admitting that it cannot comply with the 
expectations set by Jose P., let alone the mandate set by the 
IDEA. 
B. Publicly Funded Special Education Attorneys  
Another reform that would not require the assistance 
of either Congress or the U.S. Department of Education is 
the creation of an office similar to a public-defender system 
that would offer legal advice during CSE meetings and 
litigation assistance for low-income parents for children with 
qualifying disabilities.  Acknowledging the vital need for low-
income parents to access affordable legal representation in 
these matters is present throughout academic literature on 
the IDEA.199  The attorneys in this new office would provide 
the same legal assistance that many non-profit organizations 
already do on a pro bono or reduced-rate basis for low-income 
parents, such as the Partnership for Children’s Rights or 
Advocates for Children.200  The program would offer support 
for low-income parents in crafting their child’s IEP, during 
which attorneys’ fees are not currently recoverable, as well 
as in any litigation that may be necessary to ensure that 
their child receives a quality education.201  
                                                 
197 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 187. 
198 Jose P., 557 F. Supp. at 1241. 
199  See, e.g., Kerrigan O’Malley, School Inequality: Challenges And 
Solutions: Allen Chair Issue 2016: Federal Role In The Governance Of 
Public Schools: From Mainstreaming To Marginalization? – IDEA’s De 
Facto Segregation Consequences And Prospects For Restoring Equity In 
Special Education, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 951, 988 (2016); Valverde, supra 
note 113, at 623; Phillips, supra note 123, at 1849.  
200  PARTNERSHIP FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, SERVICES WE PROVIDE, 
http://www.pfcr.org/services-we-provide; ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, WHO 
WE SERVE, http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/who_we_serve.  
201 § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). 
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While “legal representation is one of the greatest 
determinants of success” in utilizing the procedural 
safeguards under the IDEA, “parents of children with 
disabilities from low-income households are less likely to 
receive legal assistance in pursuing special education 
challenges against school districts.” 202   A program that 
offered publicly funded special education attorneys would 
help alleviate this problem and also remove many of the 
institutional barriers in IDEA due process procedures that 
disproportionately affect low-income families, such as the 
necessary financial resources and institutional knowledge.  
Ensuring that the children of low-income families have 
stronger IEPs will result in stronger educational outcomes.   
The difficulty in enacting this reform is the requisite 
costs, which would be a double-edged sword for the City.  
Establishing the program would require one sum of money to 
pay the salaries of the program’s lawyers and another sum of 
money to be paid out once those lawyers are successful in 
securing tuition reimbursement claims from the City 
government, although it is fair to argue that stronger IEPs 
may reduce the need for tuition reimbursement claims later 
on.  Commentators have described such costs as “prohibitive” 
and “expensive,”203 requiring “robust funding sources,”204 and 
therefore “not likely to gain traction” among policymakers.205   
Despite the dismissive language, there does not 
appear to be a detailed estimate for creating such a program 
in New York City, although available data can help provide 
some clarity on the necessary start-up costs.  While the City 
does not release socioeconomic data on the special education 
student population, it does release data on the number of 
students who qualify for the free or reduced price lunch 
program, which can serve as a proxy for socioeconomic 
status.206  In the 2015-2016 school year, 12,052 students who 
                                                 
202 Valverde, supra note 113, at 622. 
203 Phillips, supra note 123, at 1848-49. 
204 O’Malley, supra note 199, at 988. 
205 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1455.   
206 For the 2016-2017 school year, a two-parent household with one child 
would need to earn less than $26,208 annually to qualify for free lunch.  
The same family would need to earn less than $37,296 to qualify for a 
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qualify for the lunch program were newly determined to be 
eligible for an IEP under the IDEA. 207  In the 2014-2015 
school year, that number was 12,329. 208   Assuming this 
number remains consistent from year to year, this new 
program would need to hire enough lawyers to handle an 
annual case load of roughly 12,000 students each year.  
The size of a given lawyer’s caseload varies depending 
on an individual lawyer’s capacity and the type of legal work 
in which they are engaged.  According to American Bar 
Association guidelines for lawyers working in matters 
related to child-welfare agencies, a caseload of 40-50 clients 
is considered to be reasonable. 209   Given that special 
education lawyering is a similarly fact-intensive and 
emotionally taxing endeavor as child-welfare casework, we 
can assume this new program would need to hire lawyers to 
manage at least 50 cases each, which would come out to a 
need of 240 lawyers to accomplish the program’s objectives 
each year.  Attorneys at the New York City Law 
Department, who are tasked with defending the City against 
tuition reimbursement claims under the IDEA, earn a 
starting salary of roughly $60,000. 210   Similarly, starting 
salaries for other publicly funded attorneys, like in the New 
York District Attorney’s Office or in Manhattan Legal 
Services, are also about $60,000.211  If we assume lawyers in 
                                                                                                         
reduced price lunch.  HUNGER SOLUTIONS NEW YORK, 2016-2017 INCOME 
GUIDELINES FOR FREE AND REDUCED PRICE SCHOOL MEALS, 
http://hungersolutionsny.org/information-resources/hunger-
resources/2016-2017-income-guidelines-free-and-reduced-price-school. 
207 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 158, at 6. 
208 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 157, at 5.  
209  A.B.A., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING CHILD 
WELFARE AGENCIES, at 20 (Aug. 2004), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/age
ncy-standards.authcheckdam.pdf. 
210  N.Y.C. LAW DEP’T, CAREERS, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/html/careers/students_salary.shtml. 
211 THE NEW YORK COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SALARY AND BENEFITS, 
http://manhattanda.org/salary-and-benefits; While Manhattan Legal 
Services does not publicize attorney salaries, one legal blogger put 
together an estimate based on leaked information from contract 
negotiations. Sam Wright, Legal Aid Strike Offers Window Into NY Public 
Interest Compensation, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 12, 2015), 
No. 4:398]          SOCIOECONOMIC AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 443 
 
this new program would earn about the same salary as their 
counterparts in other City government agencies, the cost of 
the new program, when only considering attorney salaries, 
would be roughly $14,400,000 each year.212 
This estimate comes with many caveats.  First, using 
the number of students who qualify for the free or reduced 
price meal program is helpful for identifying students with 
greater than average financial needs, but it likely is under 
inclusive of the number of families that would need 
assistance obtaining a lawyer given that parents cannot 
recover attorney fees obtained during a CSE meeting. 213  
Second, the number of cases an individual lawyer can 
manage will greatly affect the estimate, and this estimate is 
only based on the number of students entering the special 
education system each year, as opposed to all students 
within the system.  Third, the estimate only considers salary 
expenses when, presumably, a variety of other expenses 
would also be required to establish the program, ranging 
from acquiring the necessary office space and supplies, to the 
benefits and salary increases to which these public 
employees would be entitled.  Still, while this estimate may 
appear large, it is less than 6% of the $256 million the City 
paid in tuition reimbursement claims last year.214  
Absent a grant from the U.S. Department of 
Education, New York City would need to secure the 
necessary funding on its own.  De Blasio could raise taxes to 
fund the program, but tax rate changes in the City require 
the approval of the New York Governor and of the state 
legislature, both of which have traditionally showed hostility 
to the City and its various mayors.215  With a tax increase 
                                                                                                         
http://abovethelaw.com/2015/02/legal-aid-strike-offers-window-into-ny-
public-interest-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/FCC8-X8VT]. 
212 The algebra is as follows: 12,000 new referral students in the reduced 
price lunch program each year divided by 50 cases for each lawyer to 
manage, comes out to 240 lawyers, which when multiplied by a salary of 
$60,000, equals an annual cost of $14,400,000. 
213 § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). 
214 OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, supra note 152, at 22. 
215  A recent De Blasio effort to reform education policy in the City 
illustrates this problem: One of the Mayor’s central campaign promises 
was to establish universal public pre-school, which was to be paid for by a 
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unlikely, the City could fund the program with existing 
resources, but doing so would also be difficult.  Federal 
funding assistance for the City, and many other cities in the 
country, now face uncertainty with the impending legal 
battle over sanctuary status for undocumented 
immigrants.216  Further, the City bears the burden of being 
President Trump’s hometown, which means the City is 
responsible for the security bill for protecting Trump 
Tower.217   
While the City has already prepared for budget cuts, 
there are still two unknowns that may offer financial hope.  
First, tuition reimbursement spending has significantly 
increased since the De Blasio policy went into effect, but it is 
unclear if this spending will continue on an upward 
trajectory.  If it plateaus, or even starts to decline, additional 
funding may be available.  Second, there is significantly less 
litigation in special education occurring in the City because 
of the De Blasio policy.  It is unclear how much the City is 
saving on what would have otherwise been spent on 
attorneys to defend against such claims.  And so despite the 
financial barrier of the new program, it is clear that it could 
neutralize many of the barriers disproportionately impacting 
low-income families discussed in this Note. 
                                                                                                         
tax increase on wealthy New York City residents. De Blasio got the 
program, but did not get the tax increase to fund it.  Instead, the Mayor 
was able to work out a deal with Governor Andrew Cuomo to secure the 
additional funding through other means. Cuomo only acquiesced after 
significant lobbying and public pressure, factors that unfortunately are not 
present in the fight for special education access for low-income individuals.  
See Michael M. Grynbaum & Thomas Kaplan, Pre-K Plan Puts Cuomo at 
Odds With de Blasio on Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/nyregion/cuomo-prekindergarten-
proposal.html [https://perma.cc/2N8Y-4M42].  
216 Liz Robbins, ‘Sanctuary City’ Mayors Vow to Defy Trump’s Immigration 
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/nyregion/outraged-mayors-vow-to-
defy-trumps-immigration-order.html [https://perma.cc/3JST-44JF].  
217  It Cost New York City $24 Million to Secure Trump Tower From 
Election to Inauguration, FORTUNE (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/02/22/trump-tower-security-costs-taxpayer/ 
[https://perma.cc/N9TQ-7VCN].  
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C. Public Enforcement of the IDEA 
Most of the proposed and accomplished reforms 
related to the IDEA correctly focus on addressing the 
financial and information barriers that families face in 
pursuing private enforcement.  Whether it is the Supreme 
Court expanding the grounds on which a parent may bring 
suit for tuition reimbursement,218 Congress allowing parents 
who successfully litigate their tuition reimbursement claims 
to collect attorneys’ fees, 219  or even De Blasio’s 2014 
settlement policy,220 each of these changes implicitly affirm 
the private enforcement system.  A truly novel approach to 
IDEA reform would be to look beyond a reliance on 
individuals to guard and enforce their federal special 
education rights, and instead look to the government.  
1. The Need for Public Enforcement  
Professor Eloise Pasachoff produced a comprehensive 
summary on American special education, deficiencies in the 
IDEA private enforcement system, and existing proposals for 
improvement. 221   She provides a persuasive rationale for 
exploring IDEA public enforcement:  
Where a statute is enacted to effectuate a 
particular public policy and private 
enforcement is insufficient to effectuate that 
policy, it is reasonable to suggest that public 
enforcement is necessary if the statute is to be 
properly administered.  For example, if private 
enforcement actions are disproportionately 
brought by one segment of a statute's intended 
beneficiaries with particular demographic 
characteristics, there is likely to be 
underdeterrence of the wrong the statute seeks 
to redress with respect to other 
                                                 
218 Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 246-47. 
219 Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, PUB. L. NO. 99-372. 
220 Baker, supra note 107. 
221 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1413.   
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demographics… The need for public 
enforcement may be particularly acute where 
distribution of government funding or 
resources is at issue, for where there is 
underdeterrence, there may also be 
undercompensation of the individuals the 
public policy seeks to protect. 222 
 
The above passage aptly describes the phenomenon occurring 
in special education.  Wealthy, generally white, families 
disproportionately initiate private enforcement actions, 
resulting in what Pasachoff describes as an underdeterrence 
of providing poor quality special education for low-income, 
generally non-white, students: “When poor children enforce 
their rights at lower rates than wealthier children, the 
dynamics tend to lead to better services for wealthier 
children.”223  Unsurprisingly, “school districts seek to contain 
expenses by limiting or reducing services for those with the 
quietest voices.”224 
Public enforcement of the IDEA is not a radical 
proposal.  The mechanism for government oversight in this 
area already exists, theoretically, at the federal level.  The 
U.S. Department of Education has the power to withhold 
federal funding from states that fail to comply with IDEA 
guidelines.  Yet, despite the fact that “the federal agency 
charged with IDEA enforcement repeatedly found states in 
violation of the IDEA, it has almost never taken any formal 
action to withdraw funds, limiting its involvement to 
negotiation and acceptance of minimal improvements” 225  
DeVos’ confirmation as Secretary of Education is again 
relevant, for at least as long as the next four years, this 
practice of inaction at the federal level is unlikely to change 
under her leadership.  States and localities can step in to fill 
the leadership vacuum.   
                                                 
222 Id. at 1462.   
223 Id. at 1419.   
224 Valverde, supra note 113, at 623. 
225 Pasachoff, supra note 21, at 1462.   
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Pasachoff extensively explores the potential 
weaknesses of public enforcement, including “inefficiency, 
inadequate resources, and capture,” but correctly notes that 
such pitfalls are “design challenges rather than 
insurmountable limitations.” 226  Using this framework, we 
can assess the benefit of adopting a public enforcement 
model in New York.   
2. Public Enforcement in New York City 
Through the Public Advocate 
 New York City’s government structure is uniquely 
suited for adopting the public enforcement model.  The City 
would not need to heavily invest in creating a new agency 
and fund a new army of special education lawyers.  Instead, 
the City Council could expressly confer oversight 
responsibility of public special education to the City’s public 
advocate by amending the City Charter.  After the Mayor 
and the Speaker of the City Council, the public advocate is 
the most visible elected official in New York City.  The 
position serves as “a ‘watchdog’ over City government and a 
counterweight to the powers of the Mayor”227 by providing “a 
voice to everyday New Yorkers.” 228  Given that the public 
advocate has increasingly pursued lawsuits to combat local 
administrative failures, adding special education litigation to 
her portfolio appears to be a simple way to make a big 
difference without a significant funding allocation. 
The City Council established the public advocate in 
1993 by renaming the now non-existent position of President 
of the City Council.229  While the renaming was designed to 
                                                 
226Id. at 1462 (internal citations omitted). 
227 Green v. Safir, 174 Misc. 2d 400, 403 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (internal citations 
omitted). 
228  Samar Khurshid, James Wins Battle in Long War Over Public 
Advocate’s Legal Standing, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/city/6518-james-wins-battle-in-long-war-
over-public-advocate-s-legal-standing [https://perma.cc/RR3L-Z85Q]. 
229 James C. Mckinley Jr., A New Job for Stein, Without a Race?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/23/nyregion/a-new-
job-for-stein-without-a-race.html [https://perma.cc/UF46-EHFS].  
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decrease the influence of the office holder, the opposite has 
occurred: The four individuals who served as public advocate 
have each used the position as an opportunity to highlight 
important issues in the City to encourage reform and, in 
doing so, bolster their own public profile.230  The relationship 
between the public advocate and the Mayor is generally 
fraught with political calculation and tension, which may be 
the best rationale for entrusting the public advocate with 
more oversight responsibility for public special education.  If 
a given public advocate has ambitions for higher office, then 
they have the political incentive to uncover institutional 
failures of City government and work to impose reforms.  As 
an independently elected position, the public advocate is 
insulated from the type of capture Pasachoff discussed, to 
which many administrative offices staffed with non-elected, 
appointed positions are more susceptible.  
 The two greatest obstacles to public enforcement of 
the IDEA through the public advocate’s office are the 
existing budgetary constraints on the office and the legally 
uncertain grounds on which the public advocate may bring 
lawsuits against the City.  Despite the inherently adversarial 
relationship between the public advocate and the City, it is 
the Mayor and City Council who control the public advocate’s 
budget.  A hostile Mayor or City Council Speaker can weaken 
a public advocate through budget cuts.  Mayor Bloomberg cut 
the office’s budget from $2.9 million to $1.8 million (a cut of 
roughly 40% of the total budget) in 2010 231  and publicly 
stated that he believes the position to be “a total waste of 
money.”232  Public advocate Betsy Gotbaum called the move 
                                                 
230 Public advocates are generally considered by the local media to be 
presumptive future mayoral candidates, as two of the four individuals who 
held the position have run for mayor: Mark Green and, current mayor, Bill 
De Blasio.  See Khurshid, supra note 228.  
231 David W. Chen, Gotbaum Budget Is Cut 40%; She Calls It Political 
Payback, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2009), 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/nyregion/20advocate.html?_r=1&hpw 
[https://perma.cc/ZF7R-RGEN]. 
232 Mayor Bloomberg Doesn’t Want Public to Have an Advocate, STATEN 
ISLAND ADVANCE (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/mayor_bloomberg_outlines_s
ome.html [https://perma.cc/CJE6-J625]. 
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“political payback” and Gotbaum’s predecessor, Mark Green, 
described the cut as “a complete abuse of power.”233  While 
De Blasio has since partially restored the office’s funding to 
$2.3 million, the fiasco underscores that, under this model of 
public enforcement, Pasachoff’s concern of inadequate 
resources is valid. 234    
The question of the public advocate’s standing in a 
given lawsuit against the City or the State is sufficiently 
interesting and controversial to deserve its own Note, and 
acts as the other large barrier to effectuating this reform 
vision.  While “the public advocate’s ability to sue is narrowly 
defined and isn’t actually a power expressly given to the 
office in the city’s charter,” the officeholder has increasingly 
relied on litigation as a governing tool. 235  But because of the 
lack of explicit statutory authority in the City Charter, “the 
ability of the public advocate to pursue litigation has been 
crafted through decades of case law and precedents that have 
defined a narrow path for the office’s actual legal powers.”236   
Current public advocate, Letitia James, made her 
governing vision clear at a 2016 rally: “I want all of you to 
know that this is a new office of the public advocate … and 
now we’re going to use the office of the public advocate to 
sue.”237  Keeping her word, James has filed more lawsuits 
                                                 
233 Chen, supra note 231. 
234  Pasachoff, supra note 226, at 1463; Jill Colvin, De Blasio Nearly 
Doubles Budget for His Old Office, OBSERVER (Feb. 12, 2014), 
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235 Laura Nahmias, James Removed from Another Lawsuit Over Lack of 
Standing, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2014), http://www.politico.com/states/new-
york/city-hall/story/2016/04/james-removed-from-another-lawsuit-over-
lack-of-standing-033386 [https://perma.cc/8EAS-VC6F]. 
236 Laura Nahmias, Court Strengthens Public Advocate's Capacity to Sue, 
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Back, POLITICO (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.politico.com/states/new-
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than all of her three predecessors combined.238  But James 
owes her recent successes to the first elected public advocate, 
Mark Green, who established the necessary precedent on 
which his successors have built.  In 1997, the New York 
County Supreme Court granted Green’s request to access 
police officer disciplinary files and affirmed that Green had 
legal standing to make such a claim.239  An appellate court 
affirmed the ruling, and the New York Court of Appeals 
denied the police department’s appeal.240  In 2000, the New 
York County Supreme Court again affirmed this power, 
holding that the “public advocate is an independently elected 
official with capacity to sue.”241   
While courts have appeared sympathetic to the public 
advocate’s ability to bring claims, much to the frustration of 
other City officials, the record of success is mixed.242  The 
City Council could easily ameliorate this ambiguity by 
amending the City Charter to expressly confer such powers 
on the public advocate.  Amending the City Charter, while 
rare, is not unheard of in City politics.243  A special Home 
Rule allows the City to amend its governing document 
without the input of legislators in Albany. 244   The 
administrative inefficiencies that Pasachoff feared in 
                                                 
238 Nikita Stewart, Letitia James’s Ease in the Courtroom Informs Her Role 
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creating a public enforcement model could certainly manifest 
through protracted litigation over standing, but the City 
Council can easily fix this problem. 
Once granted such powers, the public advocate should 
not take up individual tuition reimbursement claims, but 
should rather pursue larger class action lawsuits against the 
City that take aim at widespread deficiencies in public 
special education. The goal is to improve the delivery of 
services, thereby mitigating the need for future tuition 
reimbursement claims.  Still, the Jose P. litigation provides a 
cautionary tale for this reform.  After 40 years of conference 
negotiations, the City is still struggling to keep up with the 
order: During the 2015-2016 school year, almost a third of 
students who were first deemed to have a qualifying IDEA 
disability had their IEP meeting 60 days after the child’s 
initial referral.245  The 60-day marker is significant because 
it is the period after which the Jose P. order applies.246  The 
number was about the same for the previous school year.247  
Imposing more high profile class actions against the City 
may incentivize reform, but the benefits of such action may 
take over 40 years to happen.  The primary benefit of public 
advocate action is the publicity her actions would bring to 
the issue and, if she is successful, the legal force of any 
judicial order she may secure.  This reform certainly carries 
the risk of administrative inefficiencies and would not, alone, 
be sufficient to solving the City’s special education inequality 
problem.   
 
 
                                                 
245 Of the 15,447 students who received their first referral for evaluation 
and who were found to be eligible for the IDEA during the 2015-2016 
school year, 4,583 of them had their IEP meeting held after 60 days of the 
parent’s consent for evaluation.  N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 158, at 
6. 
246 Jose P., 557 F. Supp. at 1241. 
247 Of the 15,567 students who received their first referral for evaluation 
and who were found to be eligible for the IDEA during the 2014-2015 
school year, 4,770 of them had their IEP meeting held after 60 days of the 
parent’s consent for evaluation.  N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 157, at 
5. 
452 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the proposals discussed in this Note, 
reforming the special education system so that it can 
adequately provide every qualifying child with a free and 
appropriate education will likely require reform at the 
federal level.  Much of the academic literature on this subject 
focuses on demanding that the U.S. Department of 
Education more forcefully enforce the IDEA and calling on 
Congress to fully fund the IDEA’s mandate on state and 
localities, something on which President Barack Obama 
campaigned but was not able to achieve.248   
Absent such action, there is still opportunity for 
states and localities to act.  Over the long-term, creating a 
new public defender-like agency can level the playing field 
for low-income, mostly non-white, families in New York City.  
While the program would be costly, it would effectively 
neutralize many of the barriers posed by the IDEA 
procedural safeguards that disproportionately impact low-
income families.  Until the funding for such a program is 
secured, in the short-term, the public advocate could use the 
bully pulpit of her office to rally public opinion and force 
reform through class action lawsuits.   
When discussing issues in American special education 
and potential reforms to the IDEA, it is important not to 
shame parents who are successful in their tuition 
reimbursement claims.  Parents only want what is best for 
their children, and parents who are able to secure tuition 
reimbursements do not deserve scorn for doing so.  It is not 
their fault that the system has created socioeconomic and 
racial disparities; it is the government’s fault for failing to 
create a system that takes into account how socioeconomic 
status may affect a parent’s ability to enforce their rights, 
and, because of a history of institutional racism, that 
prevents such a system from disproportionately impacting 
                                                 
248  POLITIFACT, The Obamameter - Fully fund the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/promises/obameter/promise/89/fully-fund-the-individuals-with-
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communities of color.  The reforms discussed in this Note can 
help mitigate these problems and New York City should lead 
the way in ensuring that every qualifying child, regardless of 
class or race, is afforded a free and appropriate public special 
education. 
